Nýsköpun og hönnun í
rafmagnsverkfræði: |
Þegar menn standa frammi fyrir mikilvægum ákvörðunum þá er brýnt að öll
ákvarðanataka sé skynsamleg. Skynsamleg ákvaraðanataka byggir eðli málsins
samkvæmt á öllum veigamiklum áhrifaþáttum. Enginn slíkur má verða útundan.
Þegar það gerist verður árangur óviss, tilviljanakenndur eða alls enginn.
Þess má einni geta að fákunnátta veldur því oft sem slík að menn átta
sig ekki endilega einu sinni á því hvaða ákvarðanir eru
mikilvægar!
| Dæmi: Grundvallar-hönnunarákvarðanir
(e. Fundamental Design Descisions) sem teknar eru í óhóflegum flýti og án þess að til staðar sé næg þekking. Mikil hætta á þessu þar sem á frumstigum eru flest mál illa skilgreind og "þokukennd". Lítið er til af upplýsingum sem unnt er að styðjast við. Grundvallarákvarðanir "teknar" samkvæmt hefð og án íhugunar. Menn rata hugsunarlítið eða jafnvel hugsunarlaust í slóð vana og hefða. |
Almennt má staðhæfa að:
| Þegar eitthvert fyrirbæri er athugað er brýnt að kanna og skilja alla veigamikla áhrifaþætti (e. Significant Influence Variables, Success Factors) sem máli skipta hverju sinni. Árangur byggir á mjög breytilegum þáttum frá einu sviði þekkingar og reynslu til hins næsta. Lítil trygging er fyrir að sá sem ekki þekkir til á tilteknu sviði geti tekið vitrænar ákvaraðanir sem byggjast á því. Margir gera sér afarveika grein fyrir þessu. |
Í þessu efni eru víða miklir misbrestir. Dæmin: |
Verði einhver veigamikill þáttur útundan þá er ljóst að
niðurstöður athugunarinnar verða takmarkaðar. Skeiki of miklu þá verða þær
ónothæfar. Séu slíkar niðurstöður notaðar sem undirstaða undir
ákvarðanatöku um veigamiklar ákvarðanir má búast við afdrifaríkum
mistökum. Slíkt getur falið í sér óhóflegan tilkostnað, árangursleysi,
tafir o.fl.
Mikil hætta er á að mikilvægir þættir komist ekki að eða
of lítið sé gert úr þýðingu þeirra þegar fjallað er
um mál af takmarkaðri þekkingu og reynslu. Oft má kvaða fastar að orði og
segja að slík áherslubrengl séu nánast öruggur fylgifiskur ónógrar þekkingar.
| Lítum nánar á það sem hér hefur verið sagt. "að kanna og skilja alla þá áhrifaþætti (e. Influence Variables, Success Factors) sem máli skipta hverju sinni. " 1. Hver athugun hefur tiltekinn tilgang eða markmið. Þessi tilgangur stjórnar því hvað er skoðað hverju sinni. Af þessu leiðir að eitt og sama fyrirbærið þarf að skoða á mismunandi vegu eftir því hver tilgangurinn er. Ekki er unnt að nýta nema etv. að takmörkuðu leyti niðurstöður úr athugun sem gerð hefur verið í óskyldum eða fjarskyldum tilgangi.
Það sem hér hefur verið sagt undirstrikar það að sjónarhóllinn sem markmiðið og þarfirnar amrka hverju sinni leiðir til mismunandi skoðunar og mismunandi áherslna. Og þar sem marskonar þarfir og markmið koma til greina er ekki um að ræða neina eina lýsingu sem dugar í öllum tilvikum |
Mikið er um mistök í rekstri fyrirtækja vegna þess sem hér hefur verið
tilgreint.
Þekkt og alvarleg dæmi. Einsýnar
fjármála- eða tækniáherslur sem ýta til hliðar öðrum mikilvægum áherslum svo
sem áherslu á að endurnýja og viðhalda framleiðslugetu, framleiða vörur sem
viðskiptavinirnir vilja kaupa. Sjá
Reconing (Sjá neðst á síðunni) (The Chrysler Bailout)
Niðurstaðan er sú að til að auka sem mest líkurnar á tryggum árangri er
nauðsynlegt að þekkja allar mikilvæga áhrifaþætti
Mikilvægir áhrifaþættir og fagleg einsýni. Vegna faglegrar
sérhæfingar flestra þeirra sem standa að ákvörðunum sem og þess að margar
ákvarðanir sem teknar eru krefjast víðtækrar yfirsýnar þá skapast verulegt
vandamál. Sá sem tekur ákvörðun hefur ekki fullnægjandi þekkingarlegar
forsendur til þess.
Ein helsta aðferðin til að vinna gegn þessu er sú að láta hóp manna sem
spannar alla þá þekkingu og reynslu sem þörf er á koma að ákvaðarantökunni.
Þetta er unnt ef um er að ræða stórfyrirtæki eða ríkisstofnanirnar
(sbr.allar fagnefndirnar og stjórnirnar). Sé um að ræða mjög lítil
fyrirtæki þá er þetta mun erfiðara. Þá varða menn að ná í viðkomandi
þekkingu og reynslu með því að ráðfæra sig við aðila sem þeir þekkja eða
kaupa takmarkaða þjónustu af þeim sem búa yfir sérþekkingu. Hvað stofnun
smáfyrirtækja viðvíkur þá er ráðið oft það að skipa stjórn þar sem öll
nauðsynleg þekking er saman komin. Engin tilvikjum er hve mikil áhersla er lögð á
það af fjárfestum að fyrirtæki sem þeir fjáfesta í hafi hæfa og reynda menn í
stjórnun (e.Management Team) og stjórn (e. Board of Directors)
En hvernig geta menn gert sér grein fyrir því hvað er "fullnægjandi þekkign og
reynsla"? Hvernig geta menn sem ekki búa yfir þekkingunni eða hafa
jafnvel ekki veður af því að hún kunni að vera til skilgreint þarfir sínar eða
þarfir ákvarðanatökunnar? Hafi menn ekki í nein önnur hús að venda
þá er hér á ferðinni nánast óleysanlegt vandamál.
Benda má á leiðir til að nálgast lausnina með því að kanna reynslu annarra manna
eða fyrirtækja sem búið hafa við svipaðar aðstæður eða fengist við svipuð
vandamál. Við slíka könnun lemur mjög oft í ljós að það sem menn töldu
(í fáfræði) í upphafi vera fullnægajndi yfirsýn og þekkingu var það alls ekki.
| Líking: Skipsstrandaaðferðin við sjókortagerð.
Líkja má þessu við siglingar eftir lélegum eða engum sjókortum á framandi
slóð. Ef ekki er unnt að kortleggja öll skerin og grynningarnar fyrirfram þá
fer "kortlagningin" fram með skipsströndum! Flestir ættu að geta
verið sammála um að þessi aðferð sé ekki sérlega vænleg til árangurs og að
betra sé að geta vitað fótum sínum forráð án þess að gera dýr mistök. Við bætist þegar menn fara "skipsstrandaleiðina" að engin örugg trygging er fyrir skipulegri skráningu og miðlun reynslunnar! Allt slíkt verður mjög tilviljanakennt. Nánast allaf er betra að gagna skipulega til verks. |
| Niðurstaða Það sem hér hefur verið sagt um þörfina fyrir fullnægjandi yfrisýn er einn meginhugmyndin í kerfishugsun (e. Systems Thinking) og "almennu kerfisfræðinni" (e. General Systems Theory) (P-CYB) S-LINKS |
| Árangursþættir á ýmsum mismunandi sviðum. |
Markaðssetning AV-1
Rafræn viðskipti
| "False Starts" in the Electronic Commerce Race The growth forecasts for electronic commerce conducted over the Internet are aggressive and have been for some years. Despite the obvious potential of an open network reaching tens of millions of subscribers worldwide, the actual volume of business transacted over "the Net" remains modest. Consider that 80% of Fortune 500 companies had websites late last year, but only 5% used the Internet to actually transact business with customers. We are still waiting for electronic commerce to "take off." Many companies, in fact, have experienced "false starts" in the so-called race towards Internet commerce. The typical company has built a web site. It has paid money to develop the site and is now shelling out more dollars to cover operating costs. In effect, these organizations have built mini-electronic publishing plants that can produce electronic brochures, advertising billboards, employment manuals, small reference libraries and more. Like traditional paper media, these virtual publications convey static information packages"one way only." But they do not captivate customers with the Internets capabilities for interactive communications and marketing. Nor do they contribute measurably to increased revenues, decreased costs or competitive advantage. "Getting It Right the Next Time" in Electronic Commerce Developing an Internet Business Strategy focused on competitive advantage and business results By Jean Lanoix and André Chartier, with contributions by Peter Strauss. http://www.dmr.com/corporatif/en/thought_leadership/right.htm Lærdómur: - Stórfyrirttækin eru ekki "ónæm gegn mistökum" - jafnvel þó sum þeirra reyni að vinna faglega. (ATH: Stórar stofnanir (sbr. Alþjóðabankann) hafa oft gert afdrifarík mistök (Sjá A Sampson: Money Lenders) Þessvegna: Takið sjálfkrafa ekki sem "heilagt", "rétt" eða endanlegt neitt sem kemur frá neinum! Ekki einu sinni þeim sem mesta þekkingu og reynslu eiga að hafa. Beitið sem oftast eigin dómgreind og gagnrýni á sem mest af þeim upplýsingum sem þið aflið. Iðulega kemur í ljós að veilur reynast í því sem á að vera "pottþétt samkvæmt uppruna" (þ.e. komið frá nógu "virðulegum aðila"). Samt er rétt að hafa hugfast að aukin þekking eykur líkindi á réttleika. Þekkingin tryggir á hinn bóginn ekki réttleikann! |
Stjórnun B1
Verkfræði AV1
AV2-EF
B1
AZ-EF
Engineering Disasters: Learning from Failure http://dol1.eng.sunysb.edu/disaster/
| Primary Causes of Engineering Disasters The primary causes of engineering disasters are usually considered to be (I) human factors (including both 'ethical' failure and accidents), (ii) design flaws (many of which are also the result of unethical practices), (iii) materials failures, (iv) extreme conditions or environments, and, most commonly and importantly, (v) combinations of these reasons. A recent study conducted at the Swiss federal Institute of technology in Zurich analyzed 800 cases of structural failure in which 504 people were killed, 592 people injured, and millions of dollars of damage incurred. When engineers were at fault, the researchers classified the causes of failure as follows: Insufficient knowledge ..................................... 36% Underestimation of influence ............................ 16% Ignorence, carelessness, ngligence .................... 14% Forgetfulness, error .......................................... 13% Relying upon others without sufficient control ....... 9% Objectively unknown situation ............................. 7% Unprecise definition of responsibilities .................. 1% Choice of bad quality .......................................... 1% Other ................................................................. 3%
Tacoma: http://iti.acns.nwu.edu/clear/bridge/bri_dis.html
Tacoma_Narrows brúin |
| Most accidents are system accidents; that is, they stem from complex interactions between various components
and activities. To attribute a single cause to an accident is usually a
serious mistake. In this article, we hope to demonstrate the complex nature of accidents
and the need to investigate all aspects of system development and operation to understand
what has happened and to prevent future accidents. Despite what can be learned from such investigations, fears of potential liability or loss of business make it difficult to find out the details behind serious engineering mistakes. When the equipment is regulated by government agencies, some information may be available. Occasionally, major accidents draw the attention of the US Congress or President and result in formal accident investigations (for instance, the Rogers commission investigation of the Challenger accident and the Kemeny commission investigation of the Three Mile Island incident). http://ei.cs.vt.edu/~cs3604/lib/Therac_25/Therac_1.html An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents Nancy Leveson, University of Washington Clark S. Turner, University of California, Irvine Reprinted with permission, IEEE Computer, Vol. 26, No. 7, July 1993, pp. 18-41. |
Hönnun PF1 AV-SF1
CAM
AV-BEST-PR
Vöruþróun http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/CALSsectionIIIandIV.html
Best Practices http://www.autoconsulting.com/bp-es.htm
Þekkingarstjórn http://webcom.com/quantera/Secrets.html
Ábyrgð á vörum og hönnun (e. Product Liability) B1
B2
B-ALM
AV-PLB1
PL-NAM
| Product Liability and Innovation : Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment Janet R. Hunziker(Editor), Trevor O. Jones (Editor) / Hardcover / Published 1994 Our Price: $37.95 http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/generic-quicksearch-query/002-9255237-6590434 |
Stjórnun breytinga (e. Change Management) http://www.sbm-team.com/kb/success.htm
BPR http://www.usq.edu.au/users/frizzell/bpr.htm
| Kerfisfræðin (e. "Systems Science") |
|
|
| NEW TRENDS SYSTEMS THINKING, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MANAGEMENT Matjaz MULEJ, Miroslav REBERNIK, Stefan KAJZER University of Maribor, EPF SI-62000 MARIBOR, SLOVENIA, P.O.B. 180, fax +386-62-26681 Contemporary notions of systems thinking, entrepreneurship, and management surfaced in the same period of the modern social and economic development. Life's complexity could no longer be avoided, but had rather to be faced, so did and do turbulence, speed of change, globalisation of economy and life, communication, knowledge, interdependence, competition etc. They have much in common, as well as some differences. Systems thinking aiming at holism and depth by interdisciplinary creative co-operation is not needed by entrepreneurship and management only. These two roles for running an organization differ in defining their dialectical systems, i.e. systems consisting only of a complete set of essential viewpoints (Fig. 1). http://www.sea.uni-linz.ac.at/ifsr/newsletters/vol15_1/vol15_1.html Figure 1: Entrepreneurship - Management Business or any other organizational process can be viewed as consisting of two main subprocesses: Schumpeterian creative destruction of the old, obsolete cultures, products and technologies, and their replacement by more innovative ones; here entrepreneurship is favored; utilization of the existing capacities (human, capital, information) to their full extent and stakeholders' benefit before they get obsolete; here management is favored. Fig. 2 shows a process of this kind in more detail. It shows phases of prevalence of the more entrepreneurial and the more managerial behavior. These phases replace one another all the time in an organizational process: - making an organization requires more of entrepreneurship, - growth of the organization requires more of management, - differentiation of the organization, again, stresses entrepreneurship more, consolidation of the organization, again, stresses management more. At the end of each phase, a crisis surfaces, and demands the next phase's style of running the organization. The behavior is repeated in a cycle. Figure 2: Organization Life Cycle Both figures also convey that organizational vitality and viability are best provided by entrepreneurial management and managerial entrepreneurship. Both are actually two functions of the same job - satisfying all the stakeholders to the highest possible degree by using as much of systems thinking as possible and needed. Hence, instead of talking about entrepreneurship and management as distinct concepts, it may be wiser to talk about the managerial and entrepreneurial roles that have to be performed simultaneously as phases in modern organizations, business etc. There are also distinctions, of course, e.g. institutional ones: a manager is a paid function, an entrepreneur may be an owner and/or a function, etc. Linking rather than dividing the two notions as well as other concepts is very much needed nowadays. This is what both STIQE-Conferences (Dec. 1992, and Dec. 1994 in Maribor) have been about, and also STIQE '96. Due to too much specialization and focusing, linking and interplay are left out of consideration too frequently. We are trying to help making up for this mistake. |
What is Systems Theory? http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBSWHAT.html
|
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) A unique global change research institute, the non-governmental, non-profit International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) investigates issues of sustainability and the human dimensions of global change. The Institute is situated in an 18th century Habsburg palace in the small town of Laxenburg, about 15 kilometers south of Austria's capital city Vienna. In their study of environmental, economic, technological, and social developments, IIASA researchers generate methods and tools useful to both decision makers and the scientific community. The work is based on original state-of-the-art methodology and analytical approaches linking a variety of natural and social science disciplines. Since its inception in 1972, IIASA has been the site of successful international scientific collaboration in addressing areas of concern for all advanced societies, such as energy, water, environment, risk and human settlement. After more than two decades of valuable contributions to science and policy, IIASA continues as a reputed center for innovative research, for international interdisciplinary collaboration, for conferences and workshops, and for networking with other groups of scientists around the world. Due to its non-governmental status, IIASA is independent and can provide non-political and unbiased perspectives. This neutrality and impartiality is particularly valued by those utilizing Institute research findings. Research at IIASA The research projects at IIASA cover a variety of scientific fields. The research is international and interdisciplinary. Flexibility, integration, and advantages of multi-culturism replace traditionally rigid boundaries of scientific study. The Institute's goals are:
|
http://www.mun.ca/phil/links.html
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/philinks.htm
Nánari upplýsingar.
| Customer Comments Great history of what happened to US industry. A well-written easy read of what happens when you are trying to sell what you want to sell, and not what the market wants to buy. Using Honda and Ford as examples, the author examines what happened to US competativeness in the years after WWII. It's not about Ford and Honda - the real lession for anyone in business is you can't sell what the market doesn't want to buy. The author points this out by using the two auto companies. In the era depicted, Ford built the cars the engineers wanted to build while Honda built the cars the market wanted to buy. The results were obivious. Economic reality between the US and Japan has changed, but to look at only that is to miss the point. Chrysler went from broke to economic success by simply building what the market wanted to buy. A great lesson for anyone in business. --This text refers to the audio cassette edition of this title Rick Caccia (rcaccia@yahoo.com) from San Francisco, USA , June 8, 1998 Excellent account of auto industry development This is one of my favorite books - I wish all history books were written this way. This is Halberstam's best, and gives an interesting and clear picture of several phases in Japanese and US auto industry development. Read this book, think back to the time when the US was scared to death of Japanese auto industry (end of the book), then examine how we got from that point to today. If you are interested in industry history, this is the first book to read. Others like "Car" (the Taurus account) are weak knockoffs of Reckoning. --This text refers to the audio cassette edition of this title gtoscana@yahoo.com from Monterrey, Mexico , March 20, 1998 Completely out of date Even though the book is very well researched, it is utterly out of date. It was written when many people though that all the Japanese made in industry was correct and every American manager was a bozo. (Þetta átti við marga!) Well, now it is reckoning time for the Japanese. Today, Ford Motor is a very successful company and Nissan Motors is in deep trouble. If the book had been written about GM and Toyota maybe it might still be interesting, but as it stands, it is only history. --This text refers to the audio cassette edition of this title Ástæða fyrir umskiptunum: Bandaríkjamenn tóku sig snarlega á og breyttu um stíl, lærðu m.a. margt af japönum! Vandi bandaríkjamanna var sá að þeir hunsuðu viðvaranir um olíukreppu og þröf fyrir minni og eyðslugrannari bíla á sama tíma og japanir keyrðu hart á slíka þróun. Minnstu munaði að Chrysler færi á hausinn (500-800.000 störf!) og allir stóru framleiðendurnir í Detroit lentu í vandræðum. Sjá The Chrysler Bailout http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA00Aes.html A reader , February 17, 1997 International Insight on Industry More than just a look at Ford v. Nissan, "The Reckoning" gives some perspective on the fundamental differences between how the US and Japan approached industries vital to the economic health of their respective nations. A solid lesson in how arrogance and complacency can lead to mediocrity, opening the door for new industry champions. |
http://www.opengroup.com/books/index/bkixbf1.html
http://best.me.berkeley.edu/~aagogino/synthesis/strategic.plan.html
http://www.nam.org/Search/DetailIssue.asp?ID=105&Type=NamTrak http://www.nam.org/searchissues.asp
Skills standards http://www.nam.org/Search/DetailIssue.asp?ID=133&Type=NamTrak
SW http://www.methods-tools.com/html/research_links.html
| THE SYNTHESIS STRATEGIC PLAN July 1995 For US. industry to produce better engineered designs, we must produce better designed engineers--engineers skilled at synthesizing the complex technical and societal factors of today's industrial environments and the global marketplace. 1.0 Vision The mission of the Synthesis Coalition is to reform engineering education by developing new curricular and pedagogical models that integrate Synthesis concepts throughout the curricula, with emphasis on - multidisciplinary content, - teamwork and communication, - hands-on and laboratory experiences, - open-ended problem formulation and solving, and - examples of "best practices" from industry. We have produced computer-based instructional material that integrates the diverse analytic, design, experimental and intuitive skills that are required by a practicing engineer. This material can be readily transferred and adapted to different student and campus needs utilizing the National Engineering Education Delivery System (NEEDS). Synthesis schools have created new synthesis-rich courses or modified existing courses utilizing the computer-based instructional material. Participating campuses now offer a Mechatronics Option, in which students take at least one Synthesis course (new or enhances course) during all four years of their undergraduate experience. The curricular and information infrastructures developed enable Synthesis to create K-12 linkages that build on our intellectual and pedagogical foundations. The goal of Synthesis is to develop curricular strategies and alternate modes of instruction and access that foster horizontal and vertical integration of engineering knowledge within the context of broader societal factors. Synthesis is a way of teaching as well as a way of learning. Pedagogically, it stimulates and integrates both convergent and divergent thought processes. Synthesis-based instruction is rich in "real life" engineering material, in which theory is related to engineering practice through the critical in-class evaluation of engineering case studies that are integrated throughout the curriculum with actual engineering products and processes, open-ended design problems, and "best practices" from industry. This way of teaching assures that students develop the lifelong learning skills needed to cope with change long after the "teacher" is gone. It is Synthesis-based learning, however, that is the focus of our curricular approach. Students work in groups, applying knowledge from multiple disciplines, and using analytic tools, design skills, and engineering intuition to deeply understand the task at hand. This interactive learning process permits students to integrate the disparate components of their education into a unified engineering experience. This way of learning prepares students to understand and manage the social complexity of the real world, and to exploit fully and sensitively technical opportunities to mediate the needs of our society. 2.0 The Synthesis Team The Synthesis Coalition, supported by the National Science Foundation and industrial partners, is comprised of the following eight educational institutions: California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo, Cornell, Hampton, Iowa State, Southern, Stanford, and Tuskegee Universities, and the University of California at Berkeley. Together Synthesis enjoys broad geographic diversity; a balance in size, mission, and institutional type; and a strong record of collaboration. Our Coalition members are well-represented among the nation's leading institutions: three of our schools are in the top 10% of institutions in number of bachelor's degrees granted; three are in the top 10% for degrees granted to women; five for degrees granted to African-Americans; and four for degrees granted to Chicano/Hispanics. Synthesis includes three of the nation's seven historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) that grant engineering degrees, and the three California schools graduate a relatively large number of Native Pacific Islanders. Prior to Synthesis, Hampton University, an HBCU, was just initiating new engineering degree programs that, with the help of Synthesis, are now ABET-accredited. ........ 4.1 Problems Addressed and Reforms Targeted First on the list of problems in engineering education was the imbalance in undergraduate programs -- analysis at the expense of synthesis (hence the name for our Coalition). Other problems we targeted were - rigid compartmentalization of the curricula, - outdated delivery styles, - little or no emphasis on concurrent engineering, http://www.sms.utwente.nl/vakgr/br/links2.htm - not enough industrial exposure, - too few laboratory and hands-on experiences, - slow curriculum turnover, - little emphasis on social context, and - inadequate focus on students' communication skills. As a consequence, our graduates were strong in disciplinary analysis, but weak at synthesis, open-ended problem solving, multidisciplinary design, and team work. Foundation courses were compartmentalized as a sequence of stand-alone courses, related only by prerequisite requirements. A graphic of this disjointed and poorly integrated curriculum is shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 1: Respondents were asked to rate new engineers' preparedness in eight areas and then indicate the value their organization places on preparation in that area. [NSPE, 1992]. In essence, engineering is the process of integrating knowledge to some purpose. It is a societal activity focused on connecting pieces of knowledge and technology to synthesize new products, systems, and sciences of high quality with respect to environmental fragility. -- Bordogna [1992] The goal of Synthesis is to develop curricular reforms and alternate modes of instruction and access that foster the horizontal and vertical integration of engineering knowledge within the context of broader societal factors. A Synthesis-based curriculum integrates engineering foundation courses with Synthesis modules and Synthesis courses to provide continuous reinforcement of engineering fundamentals and to motivate their relevance. This approach to curriculum structure is based on a woven fabric metaphor, as shown in Fig. 3, with "integrating threads" extending from the freshman through the senior years and across disciplines. Synthesis Curricular Options provide reinforcing pathways through the woven tapestry of engineering education. The major fully integrated option created by Synthesis is the multidisciplinary Mechatronics Option. Key issues and concepts addressed in Synthesis model curricula have been and will continue to be: 1. Synthesis Interdisciplinary Content -- Engineering curricula must expose students to creative synthesizing and open-ended problem formulation and solving experiences, teaching process in addition to content. Synthesis-based curricula emphasize interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary areas of engineering that are critical to national competitiveness. 2. Concurrent Engineering and Industry Practice -- Emphasize concurrent engineering and life-cycle design. Because concurrent application of multiple disciplines through the design cycle often require team design experience, include team building and group experiences. Bring industry into the classroom through involvement in Synthesis projects and multimedia engineering design case studies. 3. Laboratory/Hands-On Experience -- Laboratory courses offer students hands-on experience in solving open-ended engineering problems requiring teamwork, experimental design, and the integration of phenomenological theory with actual system behavior. In the Fig. 2: Schematic of undesirable compartmentalized curriculum. Fig. 3: The Synthesis vision of integrated curriculum with Mechatronics Option. laboratory the computer is key to controlling experiments and providing data acquisition, system modeling, and data analysis. 4. Communication and Social Context -- Engineering is a social activity. As a decision-maker The engineer must be able to evaluate and communicate the social implications of technology. The engineer as a driver of product realization must work with multi-disciplinary teams, customers, and vendors. Synthesis-based curricula provide opportunities for students to develop and hone their written, verbal, and graphical communication skills and work as a team with people of diverse experience and backgrounds. Societal factors and sensitivity to ethnic and cultural diversity is an important element in Synthesis curricula. 5. Advanced Delivery Systems and Learning Environments -- NEEDS facilitates revolutionary and continuing change in the classroom. Through its modular approach and its inherent nature as a shared resource across the entire engineering education community NEEDS facilitates rapid transfer of new technologies into the curriculum. Courseware modules within NEEDS are designed for ease of revision and effective use in a wide range of settings, including classrooms, laboratories, and other student environments. Courseware is designed to encourage active learning and accommodate different learning styles among a diverse student population. 4.2 The Synthesis Pedagogical Model Synthesis has created new Synthesis-based courses or modified existing courses using multimedia "courseware" -- computer-based instructional material -- and new learning environments. These courses are part of Synthesis Curricular Options, in which students take at least one Synthesis-based course each year during their regular ABET-accredited undergraduate program of study. We believe our students will graduate not only with the intellectual foundations of engineering theory, but also with experience in engineering judgment, i.e., the ability to balance the diverse factors of scientific theory with practical and sociotechnical constraints when making engineering decisions. The learning environments we have developed use state-of-the-art information technologies to promote Internet-mediated teaching and learning. We have produced computer-based instructional material that integrates the diverse analytic, design, experimental, and intuitive skills needed by a practicing engineer. This material can be readily created, transferred, and adapted to different student or campus needs using the National Engineering Education Delivery System (NEEDS), which we have developed and deployed for use by Synthesis as well as the engineering education community-at-large. Fig. 4: Kolb's model of experiential learning. Students learn in four different ways [Kolb, 1984]. The Kolb model of experiential learning (Fig. 4) captures the Synthesis pedagogical approach and provides a mapping to our curricular materials and multimedia courseware. It is a framework for organizing activities to promote learning into four areas that include reflective observation, active experimentation, concrete experience, and abstract conceptualization [Kolb, 1984; Svinicki & Dixon, 1990]. This model of experiential learning is appropriate for professional engineering education with a view towards preparation for lifelong learning and as a means of accommodating and exploiting learning style differences. Other pedagogical foundations for Synthesis-based learning are constructivist learning [Lawson, 1989], Vygotsky's model [Moll, 1990]) and the scaffolded knowledge integration framework (SKI) [Linn, 1995]. 5.0 Synthesis Curricular Options Synthesis Curricular Options integrated paths through curricula that build on modular course material. Synthesis courses included required courses in a regular degree program, and therefore affect all students in the degree program even if they are not pursuing a Synthesis-based Curricular Option. During the first four years (1990/94), Synthesis concentrated on two different Synthesis Options. The mechatronics approach to engineering systems is the application of complex decision-making to the operation of physical systems. Mechatronics Synthesis Options integrate the fields of electronics, mechanics, software and user interface design, which form the basis for the design of most consumer products today. It is therefore inter- and multi-disciplinary in nature, horizontally integrating information from multiple disciplines. The CICEE (Computer Integration in Civil and Environmental Engineering) Synthesis Options are disciplinary in content, focusing on the vertical integration of information in the field of civil and environmental engineering, emphasizing the use of computers. In addition, lower division curricular materials (Synthesis Core) were developed for lower-division cross-disciplinary courses, such as modules that emphasize freshman design, mechanical dissection, or spatial reasoning.
http://best.me.berkeley.edu/~aagogino/synthesis/strategic.plan.html
|
Readings On Resistance
by Dale H. Emery
None of these books is strictly about resistance, but don't let that stop you from reading
them. Each will give you a fresh perspective and lots of guidelines for dealing
with the resistance you encounter in your organization. And as a bonus, you'll learn many
other ways to create positive change along the way.
Geoffrey M. Bellman,
Getting Things Done When You Are Not in Charge, New York: Fireside/Simon &
Schuster, 1992
If the title alone isn't enough to entice you, here is a quotation from the preface. You
work with [...] people, searching for opportunities to pursue what you believe
to be important to the organization and yourself. You often have great clarity about what
these 'other people' ought to do and are baffled about how to get
them to do it. Does that sound like you? If you are going to read only one book on this
list, read this one!
Peter Block,
Flawless Consulting: A Guide to Getting Your Expertise Used, San Diego:
Pfeiffer & Company,
1981
This book is a classic in the consulting field, partly because of the two definitive
chapters on resistance. In one chapter Block describes the many ways resistance shows
itself, and the underlying concerns people have that lead them to resist. The following
chapter explains how to detect resistance and what to do about it. The two chapters on
contracting are also helpful in showing how to prevent resistance before it happens.
Thomas F. Crum,
The Magic of Conflict: Turning a Life of Work into a Work of Art, New York:
Touchstone/Simon
& Schuster, 1987
Resistance and conflict are close cousins. This book shows how to embrace conflict
(resistance or otherwise), turning it into an opportunity to learn and grow. Crum
bases his approach on the Japanese martial art of Aikido. The purpose of this gentle and
powerful discipline is to resolve physical conflict by making an attack harmless
without doing harm even to the attacker.
Carol Kinsey Goman,
Change-Busting: 50 Ways to Sabotage Organizational Change, Berkeley, CA: KCS
Publishing
This seriously funny little book gives fifty sure-fire ways to make sure your change
project will fail. Ignore these gems at your peril! An example: Announce a change
of values while continuing to reward the old ones. Most of these sabotage strategies are
illustrated by Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist Signe Wilkinson. As far as I
know, the only way to get this book is to order it from the author at Kinsey Consulting
Services, P.O. Box 8255, Berkeley, CA 94707, (510) 943-7850.
Naomi Karten,
Managing Expectations: Working with People Who Want More, Better, Faster, Sooner, NOW!,
New York: Dorset House Publishing, 1994
If you can get better at managing expectations yours and your customers you will have a
lot less resistance to deal with. If you absorb the lessons in this book, you will
get better at managing expectations.
Peter Senge,
The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, New York:
Currency
Doubleday, 1990
The fifth discipline in the title is systems thinking. If you want to gain a deeper
understanding of the resistance that happens in organizations, read everything you can
find about systems thinking. The Laws of the Fifth Discipline Senge describes in chapter 4
are a great place to start. Learning about the other four disciplines --
personal mastery, mental models, shared vision and team learning -- will also increase
your ability to create positive change.
Gerald M. Weinberg,
The Secrets of Consulting: A Guide to Giving and Getting Advice Successfully, New
York: Dorset
House Publishing, 1985
This is another book for consultants. In his chapter on resistance, Jerry expands on ideas
from Block's Flawless Consulting, and adds many lessons he has learned from his own
experience. You will also find the rest of this book very helpful in your role as a
consultant. If you don't see yourself as a consultant, consider Jerry's definition:
Consulting is the art of influencing people at their request. If that's what you
do, this book is for you.
Gerald M. Weinberg and Daniela Weinberg,
General Principles of Systems Design, New York: Dorset House Publishing, 1988
The Weinbergs' treatment of systems thinking is both broader and deeper than Senge's.
After reading this book, you will see into systems, including problems and
organizations, with far more clarity than before. You will recognize the principles of
systems thinking everywhere around you, especially in the resistance you get to your
proposals. When you understand and apply these principles, the changes you design will
generate less resistance and will have greater impact.
Carl D. Zaiss and Thomas Gordon,
Sales Effectiveness Training: The Breakthrough Method to Become Partners with Your
Customers, New York: Plume/Penguin, 1993
Part of creating positive change is being able to sell your ideas. For most of my life,
the very idea of having to sell my ideas made me uncomfortable. If you're like me,
this book will give you a more positive view of what selling can be. You will begin to see
selling and helping as not only compatible, but inseparable.
http://www.cs.uml.edu/Boston-SPIN/resistance.html
| David Skyrme Associates Management Insight No. 11 The Knowledge Asset "Few managers grasp the true nature of the knowledge creating company - yet alone how to manage it" (Nonaka - ref 1) It seems a curious fact of business life that the techniques for measuring and managing a firm's most vital resources are several years behind where they should be. We are today well into the information age, a fact most visibly demonstrated in some remarkable charts published in Fortune [2]. But managing information as a resource is still in its infancy. ...... Know-How Businesses - The Writers Since Drucker first described the knowledge worker and wrote that the typical large business 20 years hence will be "knowledge based" [4] there has been an increasing number of articles or books about know-how companies or knowledge workers [5]5. Most have some useful insights and some thought provoking discourse. However, none to my mind gets sufficiently into methods to analyse the knowledge asset and its value (though Sveiby has some useful models [6]). The book that I have found the most remarkable is that of Masuda [7]. Although only published in English in 1990, the original Japanese version of 1980 described in some detail how the information age would unfold into 'quaternary industries' that included arts and ethics industries as well as knowledge industries. His descriptions of 'synergistic economic systems' and 'participative democracies' based on information networking show remarkable foresight. Know-How Businesses - The Practitioners Just as Henry Ford and Alfred Sloan rewrote management theory (through practice) before the writers, so today there are exemplars of business practitioners who act in a way commensurate with innovative knowledge businesses. Individuals and companies who come to mind and are oft quoted are Ray Stata of Analog Devices, ABB, Ric Semler, Ricoh, Kelley of Bell Labs, Xerox, Merck. Much of their practice, especially in R&D, is explicitly aimed at getting the best out of their people - their 'intellectual' capital - and translating it into commercially exploitable products and services. We should look for guidelines in managing the knowledge asset in companies with high net worth compared to their physical assets (for example as measured by Tobin's q factor, cited by Stewart [5]) in industries such as biotechnology or software. The Knowledge Asset What constitutes the knowledge asset? Unlike information, knowledge is less tangible and depends on human cognition and awareness. There are several types of knowledge - 'knowing' a fact is little different from 'information', but 'knowing' a skill, or 'knowing' that something might affect market conditions is something, that despite attempts of knowledge engineers to codify such knowledge, has an important human dimension. It is some combination of context sensing, personal memory and cognitive processes. Measuring the knowledge asset, therefore, means putting a value on people, both as individuals and more importantly on their collective capability, and other factors such as the embedded intelligence in an organisation's computer systems. Today's Measures Today's financial accounting practices must bear some of the blame for our inadequacy of measuring the knowledge asset. Their techniques for valuing physical assets are highly refined, yet most company accounts tell you little about information assets, yet alone knowledge assets. They tend also look backwards in time. Quite remarkably some apparently 'healthy' companies have suffered their demise between one accounting period and the next. 'Intangibles' are receiving increasing attention, but it will need an outside initiative like the RSA's Tomorrow's Company Inquiry to change accepted practice [8]. Their 'new measure of success' working party is developing a balanced scorecard of measures, that include environmental and relationship measures as well as raw financial data. Alan Benjamin has proposed to them an outline of knowledge accounting, based on investment in people's training and experience and the time decay of their knowledge if it is not refreshed. That we do not handle things right today is evident from the 'downsizing' activities of many companies. Those very companies who just a few years ago were saying that "people are our greatest asset", have today discarded them to "cut costs". Yet there is no recognition of what they have lost. There is anecdotal evidence that some companies who had taken out whole layers of middle management are realising that some intangible asset was also lost, since although their costs have been reduced, other measures of performance such as customer service or quality have suffered. Knowledge Connections (David Skyrme Associates) Home Page Web page ref http://www.skyrme.com/insights/11kasset.htm Last Updated 9 Nov 1996 |