The School as a Democratic Workplace:  
The Political Dimension of Dewey’s Democracy and Education  
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Abstract
In Democracy and Education, John Dewey argued that teachers should have control over their own work. He was, though, not only concerned about workplace democracy for teachers. He also argued against the philosophical underpinnings of educational policies that reproduced social hierarchies in the workplace.

The main arguments of Dewey’s book support teachers’ autonomy and students’ equality. When these arguments are read in light of what he wrote about democracy in many other works, they appear to be arguments for workplace democracy. These arguments raise questions about school management that are highly relevant today when prevalent views favor a culture of control.

In a paper published in 1930, John Dewey said that for many years Democracy and Education was the book where his philosophy “was most fully expounded”.1,2 If we add to this the fact that Dewey was known as the philosopher of democracy, then we have reason to expect the text to say something important, not only about education, but also about democracy. Nevertheless, all twenty-six chapters of the book are about schools and education and, when it was originally published in 1916, it had the subtitle An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. As John Quay has explained in a recent article, the book does not contain a recipe for a democratic education, and although one chapter, chapter 7, is entitled “The Democratic Conception in Education,” the text says next to nothing about politics and government.3 Why, then, is the title of the book Democracy and Education?

In this paper I shall explain why Dewey saw this book as a book about democracy. I shall also argue that my explanation provides a clue to a plausible account of what he saw as feasible and realistic measures toward a more democratic society.

Dewey’s Conception of Democracy
To understand what Dewey’s philosophy of education has to do with democracy, we need to look at other works where his conception of democracy is laid out in more detail. In this paper I explain how the main arguments Dewey set forth in Democracy and Education can be interpreted, in light of his other works, as arguments for workplace democracy where people have control over their daily occupations. In the final section, I also explain why these arguments are especially apt now, when teachers are to an increasing extent managed rather than autonomous professionals.

In the preface to his biography of Dewey, Robert B. Westbrook described Dewey as the most important advocate of participatory democracy among liberal intellectuals in the twentieth century.4 Additionally, and more recently, other scholars have also portrayed Dewey’s conception of democracy as participatory.5 In his doctoral dissertation, Jeffrey Charles Jackson compares Dewey’s stance to four different models of democracy that are prominent in contemporary political theory: communitarianism, agonistic democracy, deliberative democracy, and participatory democracy.6 Of these four models, Jackson argues, Dewey’s is
closest to participatory democracy, and for him “we have democracy to the extent that individuals can exercise control over their lives, or, can participate in governing their lives.”

Although Westbrook portrays Dewey as an important political thinker, he says that, since early in the twentieth century, most liberal social theorists have regarded his ideal of participatory democracy as hopelessly utopian. More recently, several other scholars have described Dewey’s ideal of democracy as less than fully realistic. Ellen Condliffe Lagemann says, for instance, that however appealing his political thought may be, “there is no denying that it lacks a sense of realpolitik,” and Michael A. Wilkinson argues that Dewey evaded hard questions about power. In a book published in 2007, Lee Benson, John Puckett, and Ira Harkavy contend that, although Dewey advocated for participatory democracy, he did not provide a realistic account of how to bring it about. The problem of finding out “what specifically is to be done beyond theoretical advocacy to transform American society and other developed societies into participatory democracies” they call the Dewey Problem. Quoting Westbrook and Lagemann, they claim that Dewey did not solve this problem, which they name after him.

I do not think that Dewey would have seen this as a problem that could be solved once and for all. Neither do I think that those who describe his political thought as unrealistic and utopian are entirely fair to him. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey argued for workplace democracy in schools and for a more egalitarian system of education as measures toward a more democratic society. If the interpretation that I present is correct, he thought that children would take after their teachers; thus if the teachers act as free equals in control of their own work, schoolchildren will learn democratic conduct. That is one half of the story I will tell about what Dewey’s book from 1916 has to do with democracy. The other half is about his arguments against school traditions that reproduce inequality in work by training a minority to command and the majority to obey.

Describing a model of democracy as participatory is not very informative unless an account is given of what it is that people participate in. To understand Dewey’s idea of participation, we have to keep in mind that in various works, for instance in the second chapter of *Democracy and Education*, he described a modern society as “many societies more or less loosely connected.” One citizen may belong to many small societies, such as a neighborhood or a workplace, as well as, and at the same time as, a number of larger societies, a city or a trade union for example.

As Jackson points out, self-government requires not only participation in political processes, but also in control of the small societies to which one belongs. On Dewey’s account, the workplace is a small society that gives shape and color to the daily life of common people. For that reason, he was concerned about workplace democracy and argued “both that workers’ self-government is arrested when they must merely execute the will of another, and that it is senseless for society to exclude the wisdom of those actually engaged in an activity from influencing the methods and aims of the activity.”

A similar interpretation has been advocated by David Ellerman, who argues that Dewey placed great importance on workplace democracy, where workers control their companies. Ellerman also outlined parallels between Dewey and John Stuart Mill in their responses to Immanuel Kant’s argument that says, in effect, that persons subordinate to a master or employer do not have any civil personality. Kant took this to be sufficient reason for denying the democratic franchise to employees, “while Mill and Dewey drew the opposite conclusion that the ideal of democracy should be applied to the workplace.”

In what follows, I support Jackson’s and Ellerman’s interpretation. I do not, however, claim that everything Dewey says about democracy in *Democracy and Education* fits into one model of democratic participation. There are, as Peter T. Manicas has argued, “many strands in his thought, sometimes conflicting strands.” Although some studies of Dewey’s philosophy of education mention people’s direction of their own work as relevant to democracy, the strand that I highlight is rarely taken much note of in scholarly work on

_Democracy and Education_. The collections of papers on _Democracy and Education_ edited by David T. Hansen, Patrick M. Jenlink, and Leonard J. Waks and Andrea R. English, for instance, do not contain any discussion of workplace democracy.¹⁹

In chapter 7 of _Democracy and Education_, Dewey opens a discussion about how education relates to democracy:

The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. ... But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.²⁰

It is clear from this quotation that Dewey took democracy to be something more than a form of government. It is not clear, however, what it is in addition to a form of government. Almost anything two or more people do as a group can be labeled “a mode of associated living,” and so long as they are aware of each other, we can call it “conjoint communicated experience.” The deeper explanation Dewey gives is not very informative, at least not if it is read in isolation. To understand what it means, we have to look at some of the works he wrote before _Democracy and Education_, that is, before 1916.

Dewey’s first work on democracy was a paper entitled “The Ethics of Democracy,” which was published in 1888. This paper was written in response to _Popular Government_ by the British jurist and historian Henry Sumner Maine. In that book, published in 1885, Maine said that democratic ideals and calls for popular suffrage were on the rise. Nevertheless, he argued, popular government was unlikely to give much power to the common man because “in wide democracies, political power is minced into morsels, and each man’s portion of it almost infinitesimally small.” Quoting a book by James Stephen from 1873, he added, “The man who can sweep the greatest number of fragments of political power into one heap will govern the rest.”²¹ On Maine’s account, popular suffrage will only give rise to new political elites who will be no more equal to the people than the ruling class of a nondemocratic regime.

Maine’s arguments rest on the premise that democracy “is simply and solely a form of government” based on popular suffrage.²² He then points out that the right to vote will not enable the multitude of people to make up their minds or come to any conclusion except on the simplest questions. Thus, according to Maine, the will of the people consists merely in the adoption of opinions of members of the political elite. He also contended—already in 1885—that while the government of the United States rested on popular suffrage, it was nevertheless the case that there had “hardly ever before been a community in which the weak” were “pushed so pitilessly to the wall.”²³

Dewey did not deny that Maine’s conclusions followed from his premises, nor did he question his contention that a mere aggregate of people did not have a common will. Rather, Dewey’s strategy was to question Maine’s basic premise, that democracy was just a form of government. In the 1888 paper, he described a democratic society as an organic community where each individual is “the localized manifestation of its life.”²⁴ It requires such a society to be more than a mere aggregate:

And if as actually happens, society be not yet possessed of one will, but partially is one and partially has a number of fragmentary and warring wills, it yet follows that so far as society has a common purpose and spirit, so far each individual is not representative of a certain proportionate share of the sum total of will, but is its vital embodiment.²⁵

Dewey granted that a particular form of government does not suffice for unifying a group with fragmentary and warring wills. Almost three decades later, when he published _Democracy and Education_, he still thought that in order to form a community or society, people must share some “aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding—like-mindedness” as he said in the first chapter.²⁶ In chapter 3 of
the same book, he touched on ideas about the social construction of the self and implied that such sharing was an inevitable part of social existence. In his introduction to Dewey’s main work on political philosophy, *The Public and Its Problems,* published in 1927, Melvin L. Rogers describes Dewey’s vision of democracy as involving “a public culture or ethos.” One thread that runs through *Democracy and Education* has to do with the role schools play in creating this public culture or like-mindedness, and counteracting “the centrifugal forces set up by juxtaposition of different groups within one and the same political unit.”

These ideas about how and why society needs a public culture, ethos, common spirit, or like-mindedness are a salient part of what James A. Good calls the permanent Hegelian deposit in Dewey’s philosophy.

In the quotation above, Dewey writes about the common spirit as only partially real, something a society may have only to a very limited extent. Similar notions recur in later works. In *The Public and Its Problems,* for instance, he says that as an ideal, democracy is “not a fact and never will be.” He describes democracy as an ideal of community life, something that may flourish in small communities, and can also be real to some extent in a larger society, provided the constituent smaller societies communicate and cooperate.

In *The Public and Its Problems,* Dewey argued that democracy must begin in face-to-face communities, in the cooperation of free and equal citizens, and that without democratic participation at the local level political democracy is not viable. This is, as Erin McKenna maintains in her feminist interpretation of Dewey, because fraternity has its roots in small societies at the local level. Similar thoughts about fraternity as a precondition of political democracy were voiced by other philosophers in the first decades of the last century. George Santayana, for instance, in a paper originally published in 1920, argued that democratic forms of government presuppose that fundamentals are silently agreed upon and taken for granted, otherwise “a decision by vote would be as alien a fatality to any minority as the decree of a foreign tyrant, and at every election the right of rebellion would come into play.”

In various writings, from his earliest work on democracy to his mature political philosophy in *The Public and Its Problems,* Dewey used the catchphrase of the French revolution—Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—to describe democracy. In the aforementioned 1888 paper, he emphasized fraternity, that is, common purpose and spirit. In a paper from 1919 entitled “Philosophy and Democracy,” he proposed to define democracy in terms of liberty, equality, and fraternity. He admitted, however, that this definition was vague because there was no agreement about the meanings of these three words. Having said that much, he then posed the question: “Do they apply purely politically, or do they have an economic meaning?”

One of Dewey’s main works, *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* was published the following year in 1920. Chapter 7 of that book ends with a comment on democracy where he also associates it with politics on the one hand, and with work or industrial arrangements on the other. There he says that, if democracy has a moral meaning, “it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society.”

It seems to follow that one of the most important benefits of democracy is that it enables people to flourish in work. Similar concerns can be found in several of Dewey’s publications from the same period. In a paper from 1918, entitled “What Are We Fighting For?”, he criticized political control of industries and said that the term *socialism* covered many alternatives, some of them more properly described as state capitalism. In what followed, he said that “the wage-earner is more likely to be interested in using his newly discovered power to increase his own share of control in an industry than he is in transferring that control over to government officials.” In “Freedom of Thought and Work,” published in 1920, Dewey also wrote about the importance of freedom in the workplace.

Large numbers of men have reached the point where they feel, and are beginning to see, that they can get true freedom of mind only when they can exercise their minds in connection with their daily occupations. Executives, managers, scientific men, artists have such freedom. Why not the others? In these works from
1918, 1919, and 1920, Dewey seems to think about democracy as requiring and involving liberty, equality, and fraternity in smaller societies than the political body, especially in the workplace. But what about 1916 and the years before that? What did he think about this at the time he was working on *Democracy and Education*?

### The School as a Democratic Workplace

A number of works Dewey published in the first two decades of last century show that he was concerned about teachers’ professional autonomy and democratic control of their work. Thirteen years before *Democracy and Education*, in 1903, he published a paper entitled “Democracy in Education.” After a brief introduction, the paper is divided into two parts: the first is about empowering teachers, and the second about giving the learners some control over their own school work.

The first part opens with a statement to the effect that teachers are, as a matter of fact, powerless, and the system of education is therefore not democratic. He then expands on this, saying,

> But until the public-school system is organized in such a way that every teacher has some regular and representative way in which he or she can register judgment upon matters of educational importance, with the assurance that this judgment will somehow affect the school system, the assertion that the present system is not, from the internal standpoint, democratic seems to be justified.41

In this quotation, Dewey advocates workplace democracy for teachers, and in what follows he also alleges that democracy has first and foremost to do with people’s control over their own work:

> What does democracy mean save that the individual is to have a share in determining the conditions and the aims of his own work; and that, upon the whole, through the free and mutual harmonizing of different individuals, the work of the world is better done than when planned, arranged, and directed by a few, no matter how wise or of how good intent that few?42

The latter half of this rhetorical question indicates that Dewey not only thought of workplace democracy in schools as beneficial to the teachers, but also as something good for the students. A little later in the paper, he adds that “undemocratic suppression of the individuality of the teacher goes naturally with the improper restriction of the intelligence of the mind of the child.”43 This foreshadowed what he was to say, in chapter 3 of *Democracy and Education*, about the “predominating influence of association with fellow beings in the formation of mental and moral disposition.”44 Teachers need independence and responsibility to foster democratic outlook in their schools.

In a 1913 paper, “Professional Spirit Among Teachers,” Dewey pointed out the connection between professionalism and autonomy and said that there is “no better way calculated to retard and discourage the professional spirit than methods which so entirely relieve the teachers from intellectual responsibility as do the present methods.”45 The main idea seems to be similar to the thesis he defended in the paper from 1903, namely that teachers should have control over their own work. This is a special case of Dewey’s more general advocacy of workplace democracy that gives people freedom to use their own wits to get ahead with their tasks. Two years later, in 1915, he applied the same type of reasoning to American universities in the paper “Faculty Share in University Control.” There he argued for “giving the teaching body in universities a greater share in the control of university policies.”46

In 1916, the year *Democracy and Education* came out, Dewey published a paper entitled “The Need of an Industrial Education in an Industrial Democracy.” There he explained his ideal of democracy in simple terms and said that “universal suffrage, direct participation in the choice of rulers, is an essential part of political democracy.”47 In the next paragraph he added that “political democracy is not the whole of democracy” and that it can “be effectively maintained only where democracy is social.”48 In what follows,
Dewey says that many phases of industry are unfavorable to genuine democracy because machine-industry has made work “mechanical and servile.”4 In his view, this was not only bad for the workers as individuals but also for the industries, as it bred irresponsibility and lack of initiative.9

In several other publications from the years before 1916, Dewey deplored both teachers’ lack of professional autonomy and the undemocratic tendencies of the system of education to foster and strengthen social hierarchies. He repeatedly pointed out that class divisions condemned the majority of people to work which they had neither interest in nor control over, thus making their efforts less beneficial than they could be, both for themselves and for others. Three examples of this are the papers “Culture and Industry in Education,” published in 1906; “Some Dangers in the Present Movement for Industrial Education,” from 1913; and “Splitting up the School System,” from 1915.

Let’s now look at what Dewey said about democracy in Democracy and Education, and examine how the political message of that book can be understood in light of the interest in workplace democracy evident in the works mentioned above.

Democracy in Democracy and Education

There is no mention of democracy in the first six chapters of Democracy and Education. In the beginning of chapter 7, Dewey writes about how to measure “the worth of any given mode of social life”51 and proposes a criterion or standard composed of two elements:

Now in any social group whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find some interest held in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?52 The second trait has to do with communication and cooperation between the many small societies that make up the bigger ones. The first one has to do with fraternity within an association or society. It can, according to Dewey, be thwarted by a separation of society “into a privileged and a subject class.”53 It requires liberty and equality connected to work, according to Dewey, and he points out that when men are engaged in activities in which they have no personal interest, they work as slaves “even where there is no slavery in the legal sense.”54 In chapter 2 there are similar remarks about social activities, as when Dewey says that a workhorse is not a co-partner in a shared activity since he “does not really share in the social use to which his action is put.”55 The reason Dewey provides is that horses do not have the same interests, ideas, and emotions as the people they work for. It seems to follow that those who have no interest in what they do to earn a living work as horses or slaves rather than as free men. If the first element of the standard is applied to work, it requires that people who work together have a shared interest in what they are doing. Similar thoughts recur later in the book, for instance in chapter 19 where Dewey says that when people have an “active concern in the ends that control their activity, their activity becomes free or voluntary and loses its externally enforced and servile quality, even though the physical aspect of behavior remain the same.”56

After Dewey has introduced the twofold standard in chapter 7, he says that the two elements “both point to democracy” and that “these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society.”57 It is not easy to understand how exactly these two elements point to democracy. It seems evident, though, that a part of Dewey’s message in the first part of chapter 7 is that, insofar as people lack personal interest in their work, the small society of the workplace is undemocratic. It also seems clear that the criterion has to do with horizontal communication within society, that it requires fellowship of equals and groups of equals rather than commands from superiors to inferiors.
This discussion in chapter 7 concludes with the remark, “Subsequent chapters will be devoted to making explicit the implications of the democratic ideas in education.” It is, however, not clear from the text of Democracy and Education what exactly Dewey means by “democratic ideas.” The next chapter, chapter 8, is a defense of teachers’ autonomy. After that, most of the remarks that have to do with democracy are about equality and the harmful effects of class distinctions.

In the opening paragraph of chapter 8, Dewey says that if the aims people work toward are “determined by an external dictation,” then “their aims will not arise from the free growth of their own experience, and their nominal aims will be means to more ulterior ends of others rather than truly their own.” In what follows, he uses strong words against externally imposed educational aims and maintains that the individual teacher is too rarely “free from the dictation of authoritative supervisor, textbook on methods, prescribed course of study, etc.” He concludes, in the summary at the end of the chapter, that externally imposed aims render “the work of both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish.” Dewey seems to have thought that something similar applies to other occupations since he said that there “is nothing peculiar about educational aims. They are just like aims in any directed occupation.” His argument was meant to apply to all sorts of work because, in his view, equality and local control were important everywhere.

If these two chapters, 7 and 8, are read together in light of what Dewey says about workplace democracy in other publications, then they can be seen as an argument for workplace democracy in schools. Chapter 7 is, at least partially, about the importance of horizontal communication and teachers’ interest in their work, and chapter 8 about the harmful effects of too much control from above. Taken together, this implies that teachers should have control over the schools.

In the first six chapters of the book, Dewey explained and defended his conception of education as an open-ended activity that cannot be directed successfully by detailed mandates. These chapters thus support the main conclusion of chapter 8, that teachers should be in control of their work.

In later chapters of Democracy and Education, Dewey argued that education should enable all people to gain command over their own work. He was not only concerned about workplace democracy for teachers. In chapter 9, for instance, he said that progressive education should “take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation.” The deprivation he was concerned about was not only poverty, but also, as he said in chapter 23, the fact that “so many persons have callings which make no appeal to them.” In his view, the greatest evil of the present regime was that most people were “shut off from equality” because others had excessive control over their work.

In chapter 14, Dewey warned against schooling that merely prepared people for making a living through “doing things which serve ends unrecognized by those engaged in them, carried on under the direction of others for the sake of pecuniary reward.” In chapter 19, he criticized school traditions that sustained class distinctions and provided only “servile training” for the laboring classes. In this same chapter, he argued that behind the abstract distinctions of pedagogical discussion, there loomed “a social distinction between those whose pursuits involve a minimum of self-directive thought” and those who control the activities of others. In Dewey’s view, these school traditions, which he traced back to Aristotle, walked hand-in-hand with industrial arrangements where “the great majority of workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits and no direct personal interest in them. The results actually achieved are not the ends of their actions, but only of their employers.” Right after this, he said that the present form of democracy was only political, that in the economic region, control remained “external and autocratic.” Finally, in the last chapters of the book, those after chapter 19, Dewey criticized dualistic modes of thinking, which he saw as philosophical underpinnings of educational policies that reproduced relations of subjection and domination, “where the many are not expected to have aims or ideas of their own, but to take orders from the few set in authority.”
The two arguments I have mentioned, the one against externally imposed educational aims and the one against school traditions that reproduce inequality, are the backbone of Democracy and Education and both are, albeit obliquely, arguments for workplace democracy.

Concluding Remarks

From Dewey’s perspective, Democracy and Education was a book about democracy because, for him, democracy had more to do with work and everyday life than with what is commonly called politics. In his view, democracy involved liberty, equality, and fraternity in small societies, especially in the workplace, and he was concerned about teachers’ control of their work. Thus he saw arguments against externally imposed educational aims as arguments for democracy. The same is true of arguments against any schooling that fosters class distinctions and social hierarchies in factories, shops, and corporations. The political philosophy Dewey advocated in Democracy and Education was primarily about “a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent” and people work together as free equals.

These arguments raise questions about school management that are highly relevant today, when the most common view of educational aims favors prescriptivism and a culture of control, and governments are imposing centrally mandated learning standards in response to the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey results. Such standards are a salient part of what Pasi Sahlberg describes as a global education reform movement that is changing “the nature of teaching from an open ended, nonlinear process of mutual inquiry and exploration to [a] linear process with causal outcomes.”

In his historical account of how teachers in the United Kingdom have lost control of their work, Roy Lowe describes increased government control of schools in the final decades of the twentieth century as an epidemic of policy making, and concludes that a “society which was prepared to defer to the expertise of the teaching profession has become one in which teachers are subject to constant public scrutiny.” Writing about similar trends in New Zealand in the 1990s, John Codd describes the outcome of increased managerialism as a culture of distrust where teachers are managed rather than treated as autonomous professionals. He argues that “trust breeds more trust and conversely distrust breeds more and more distrust, producing virtuous or vicious circles.” On his view, low trust goes hand-in-hand with hierarchical control and reduced moral agency. Quoting the New Zealand economist Timothy John Hazledine, Codd reminds the reader that people who are systematically not trusted will eventually become untrustworthy. Tanya Fitzgerald builds on Codd’s account of teachers as managed professionals and concludes that reform that was ostensibly designed to provide schools with flexibility and autonomy has given rise to a tyranny of bureaucracy.

In a recent book, Bob Lingard, Wayne Martino, Goli Rezai-Rashti, and Sam Sellar describe the effects of managerialism in a more global context than did Lowe and Codd, who focused on education in the United Kingdom and New Zealand toward the end of the last century. Like Lowe and Codd, they see increased top-down management of education as forcing schools “into a counterproductive feedback loop.”

These recent publications should remind us of the urgency of Dewey’s plea for democracy. What if he was right, or almost right, about the social construction of the self, and about liberty, equality, and fraternity in small societies as necessary preconditions of political democracy? What if his arguments for workplace democracy hold true? How do highly regulated schools, where teachers have little control over their work, affect the mind of the child? Do teachers who adjust themselves to undemocratic work conditions, willy-nilly, bring their students into “likemindedness,” making them submissive and lacking in initiative and responsibility?
Notes


2. LW 5:156.


8. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, xv.


20. MW 9:93.


24. EW 1:237.

25. EW 1:237.
27. MW 9:38.
31. LW 2:328.
32. LW 2:367–368.
35. EW 1:248.
36. LW 2:329.
37. MW 11:49.
38. MW 12:186.
41. MW 3:231.
42. MW 3:233.
44. MW 9:38.
45. MW 7:112.
46. MW 8:109.
47. MW 10:137–138.
50. MW 10:140.
55. MW 9:17.
56. MW 9:268.
57. MW 9:92.
58. MW 9:94.
72. MW 9:326.

Bibliography


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